

Military art of Zahiraddin Muhammad Babur

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fight on the Panipatsky field, fight at Khanva, a medieval feudal home guard, tactical reception «Tulgama».

Annotatsiya

In given article strategy and tactics of armies of Z.M.Babura applied reveals during battles in territory of medieval India, feature of management and interaction by armies

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Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur written many chronicles, annals, scientific research, artistic works. He was a great commander and ruler. Today, much in the activities of Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur becomes relevant and of great value, and the historical heritage requires compulsory scientific study.

Zahiraddin Muhammad Babur (1483-1530), a descendant of the great Amir Timur, a native of the city of Andijan in the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan, was the last Timurid ruler of Maverannahr and the first ruler he founded India - the dynasty is known throughout the world as the Moguls - a somewhat mutated word «Mugul» which the Persians designated the Mongols. His father was the ruler of Ferghana Sheikh Omar Ebussid.

Babur is a lion, a nickname that he received in his youth for his courage and militancy. At the age of 12 Babur inherited his father's throne of the Sultan. But soon he was banished from the Fergana Valley by the insurgent local population, led by Sheibanikhan.

In 1504 he came to Afghanistan, the fiefdom of the descendants of Timur, where at that time, too, continuous civil strifes were taking place. Taking advantage of the difficult situation. Babur managed to master Kabul and Ghazni cities, he became the head of the Afghan state and for a number of years was engaged in the equipment of the army and the strengthening of the state. In 1507 he took the title of padishah, and in 1508 he had a son Humayun, future heir.

Until 1513, Babur tried to restore his former influence in Central Asia, whence he was once expelled, including with the help of the Iranian Shah Ismail - but he could not achieve it. Therefore, Babur's interest gaze soon turned to India. As early as 1503, he heard a story about Timur's victorious campaign in Delhi. Since then, the idea of the repetition of the deed of a great ancestor has sunk into his soul. Beginning in 1519, Babur made a total of five trips to the territory controlled by the sultans of Delhi.


Babur did not receive a systematic education, but by nature he was endowed with great cleverness,

practical understanding and intelligence. He became one of the most brilliant generals, able to synthesize almost all military and technical achievements of that time and use different methods of combat.

The first mention of the use of firearms by the Babur army refers to the 3rd march to India in 1519, against the city-principality Bajaur. Obviously, this is the first use of firearms in Central Asia and Northern India. As Babur writes in his biography of Babur-nam, the Bajnaurians «have never seen rifles and therefore did not fear them at all, more than that, when they heard rifle shots, they stood opposite the shooters and made all sorts of indecent movements, mocking». The city was taken by storm¹.

However, the decisive was the 5th campaign, during which a decisive battle took place on the Panipat field on April 21, 1526 against the Delhi sultan Ibrahim. Babur had 12 thousand soldiers, according to the later historian Ferisht - 10 thousand. Among them was a detachment armed with guns, and guns with servants. Ibrahim had 100 thousand soldiers and 1000 elephants, but there was no firearm.

Babur built his army in a rather complicated way - the center headed by Babur himself with separate flank units, left and right wings, on the edges of which there were also separate small detachments, the avant-garde, special reconnaissance squad and the «strike detachment» - «tarah» (reserve).



Сражение при Панипате 21 апреля 1526 г.

Fig. 1. Battle on the Panipat field on April 21, 1526.

One of the flanks covered the city of Panipat, the other was covered with a moat and a palisade of trees and a prickly bush. There were collected 700 wagons, which were placed in the center. According to Babur-name, «Ustad Ali Quli was ordered, according to the custom of the rooms, to connect the wagons between the oboe instead of chains with belts of rawhide bovine skin. Between each pair of wagons put six or seven shields, archers become behind the wagons and shields and shoot with rifles. «Among these fortifications, a gap was left, through which 100 or 150 riders could pass in a row. Thus, the infantry with artillery was placed in the center, and the cavalry on the flanks and in the reserve (Fig. 1.).

The Delhi Army first randomly attacked the center of the Babur's army, but stopped in front of the line

¹ Babur-name. Notes of Babura. Tashkent. 1993. 464 p.

of wagons. According to the accumulated masses of Ibrahim warriors, fire was opened from rifles and cannons. At the same time, Babur's cavalry executed the «Tulgama» maneuver, that is, the oncoming rapid detour from the flanks and a blow from the rear. The Delhi army was defeated and fled, killing 15-16 thousand people, including Sultan Ibrahim.

From the point of view of strategy and tactics, the Babur's victory was achieved by the best organization of the troops, skillful maneuvers, the use of Wagenburg, but especially using of artillery, very effective in the thick masses of the enemy. In addition, Indian horses and elephants were, apparently, unfamiliar with the rumble and smoke of gunpowder, which increased the turmoil in the army of Ibrahim.

Exactly the same tactics Babur adhered to in the second decisive battle too, March 13, 1527 with Khanva against the Rajput princes, led by Rana Saiga².

Sangi's army was a medieval feudal militia equipped with swords, bows, spears and absolutely no firearms. Before the battle the troops usually turned in a line, with the center and flanks being separate corps and headed by them, often practically independent in their decisions from the commander-in-chief of the feudal lords. The depth of the front was not created by reserve, but by the presence of the avant-garde - which, however, did not play a special role in the battle, with the aim of just covering the deploying troops.

All these buildings themselves were composed of feudal squads. On the one hand, it allowed the commander to maneuver such druzhinami as tactical units, but on the other - introduced a certain mess in the actions of the army on the battlefield.

The main force of Sanga was the cavalry, and Rajputs were a sample of the medieval cavalry. Virtually all of them had chain mails or cuirasses equipped with shoulder pads.

In addition to cavalry, medieval Indian armies in large numbers included combat elephants. On their backs was built turrets, where not only the driver was sitting, but also the archer from Bok's bow was covered with thick blankets, and a plate shield, sometimes equipped with a point with which the elephant was trained to fight against the enemy animal, was attached to the forehead.

The tactics of the Rajput armies had a pronounced offensive character, usually ahead of the elephants, whose aim was to break the enemy's formation. After this, the cavalry entered the battle, attacking either with dense detachments or with lava. In hand-to-hand combat, the cap was affected by the advantage of the rajput fencer. The infantry was small and used only to defend the camp, or it was not at all.

In the army of Babur, the cavalry also constituted a significant part. With a certain similarity of weapons and tactics with the Rajputs' cavalry, it was whiter than the lowest quality, so Babur focused on other kinds of troops. They were artillery and infantrymen. Here a huge role was played by the «fashion» of the Ottoman type of weapons that at that time covered all of Upper and Middle Asia. In the army of Babur was a large number of small arms, guns, and even mortars, used in field battles. According to the Ottoman model, Babur used mobile field fortifications - for example, pairs of wagons attached in pairs, on which were light curls.

The army of Babur was small, but it possessed grate firepower, hitherto unprecedented in India. The tactics of Babur's troops were very flexible. In a collision with a numerically superior adversary, Babur usually used the method of active defense, which allowed him to wear out the enemy, after which he dealt the final blow.

In preparation for this battle, having collected a huge army, Rana Sanga went to Mevat and soon

² Svetlov. Fight at Khanva. Great moguls win India.

approached the fortress of Biana, which occupied an important strategic position on the border between the possessions of Babur and the Rajputs. The fortress was occupied by him relatively easily. Babur, who wanted to get ahead of the Rajputs, also sent a detachment of 1,500 men to take over the city, but in the actions of his people, confusion and fervor prevailed, and the rajputes were far superior to the enemy by number. As a result, his troops were completely routed.

If Rana Sang had developed this success, he could well count on the final victory over Babur, as the psychological and strategic advantage was on his side. By that time, in addition to Hasan Khan, he was joined by a number of major leaders, including Sylhadi (Salah-ad-Din) of Raishin, Baram Div and Narsang Div of Marwara, Medina Rao of Chanderi, Mahmoud Lodi, brother of the slayers of the Delhi Sultan Ibrahim, and others. Mahmud., Behind whom the cunning Sanga diplomatically recognized the right to the throne (seeking to keep an influential ally and letting Babur know who he really believed as the true ruler), he brought with him 10,000 supporters of Medina Ras and the Rajah Marwara granted Sange 60 thousand people, and Hasanhan - 10 thousand.

Given the complexity of the situation, Babur summoned his son Humayun for reinforcement. Mogul also succeeded in attracting Aziz Khan, Uncle Ibrahim Lodi, to his side. Fearing betrayal, the Mogol commander sent some Hindu commanders to remote areas and the pretext of protecting the borders.

In the meantime, Babur went to Khanv, a village in the Biana area, which was 37 miles west of Agra and 10 miles from the Sikri River where; He was already waiting for Rana Sang. The armies approached each other.

According to Babur's «Notes»³, the Rajput army included 2 lakhas, that is, 200,000 people. As for the number of troops of Babur, they were much smaller than Rana Sanga's, probably about 30,000 soldiers. Babur had enough time to equip the positions of his army. He arranged it in the same order as in the battle of Panipat. Ahead, on one line there were almost a thousand wagons with cannons connected with each other by iron chains, Behind them was the entire army of Babur. Between the pairs of wagons there were gaps of 50-60 meters, capable of skipping up to 100 riders. Behind them occupied the position of artillery under the command of Nizamaddin Ali Khalifa. In the herds, Ali Cooley, with his mortars and other implements on the wheels, was placed in front of the center of the right wing commanded by Humayun. Musketeer waves under the leadership of Mustafa Rumi and their tripods were placed in line with guns, just behind a moat dug where artillery support was deemed insufficient. Right after the artillery riders were formed, divided into a center, right and left wings, with the right and left flanks bordered by detachments of elite cavalry, who were entrusted with special tactical tasks in battle.

Babur himself was in the center. His brother Chin Timur and experienced military commander Khusraw Kukaltash were located to his right. Seyid Mahdihoja commanded the left wing. Before the battle, Babur rode on horseback from one flank to another, encouraging the soldiers and simultaneously ordering them not to go without orders. Each participant in the battle knew his place in the battle and the circle of his duties, which was very important for the overall success of the operation.

The army of Rana Sanga was divided into four traditional parts - the avant-garde, the center, the right and left wings, there was no reserve. Under his leadership were seven top Rajput leaders, nine chiefs of the title «rao», 140 ranks lower commanders, 80 thousand horsemen and 500 battle elephants.

At 9 am on March 17, the battle began. Huge hordes of Rajputs began to approach the center of the Babur army in deafening cries. However, right there, on the orders of Ustad Ali Quli, a test shot was shot from

³ Babur-name. Pointed composition. 1993. 464 p.

the mortar. A huge stone core with a crash flew from the trunk and crashed into the ground near the front line of the Rajputs, making a confusion in their ranks. The fighting elephants were also frightened. Standing in the center of Babur's musketeers opened an intense aim fire, which turned out to be very effective.

Aware of the small number of his forces and understanding that the enemy will try to use a numerical superiority, Babur planned to sit in the first stage of the battle behind defensive rows, massively using firearms, when the enemy weakened enough, it was necessary to take the risk and go into the attack. Babur completely controlled the situation in his army and constantly dispatched couriers, giving directions to various parts.

The powerful fire protection was a very unpleasant surprise for Rapa Sanga. Thanks to her, the center of Babur's forces became completely invulnerable to Rajput attacks, so the ruler of Mevar, who originally intended to hit the center of the enemy's position, had to change his plan. He sharply weakened the onslaught in this sector and regrouped his forces in order to direct their attack on the right and left wings of the Babur army.

At first the Rajputs rushed to the right flank of Babur's troops, using as a cover the advance of battle elephants. The onslaught of the Hindus was extremely strong and the right wing of the defenders suffered greatly, the troops were already going to retreat, but Babur, having understood the situation, was sent to them by the detachment of Chin Timur.

After his vigorous intervention, the attack of Rajputs drowned, moreover, Chin Timur undertook a bold counterattack, fell into the ranks of the Rajputs and advanced deep into their positions almost to the center, which caused confusion in the entire enemy army. However, the Rajput quickly recovered and again attacked the right wing of the army of Babur. To repel their offensive, Babur had to again move troops from the center.

Babur was often used in battles tactical reception of the Tulgamo, the so-called «joining of the two horns of the crescent», two mobile cavalry detachments tried simultaneously to bypass the position of the opponent, from the flanks and surround him. Babur several times throughout the battle sent out groups of Tulgams who were on the very edges of the left and right wings of his army, against the flanks of the Rajputs, but each time they came back without success, because the numerical superiority of the Rajputs was too great.

The battle was very stubborn. The main attack of Rajput was done on the left flank of Babur, but the artillery scattered their cavalry. Nevertheless, firearms still proved stronger than Rajput heroism and contempt for death. In addition, the Indians were very tired and could no longer fight with the old fervor. Seeing that the pressure of the Rajput attacks was no longer the same, both flanks of Babur's army moved enthusiastically to the victorious attack. The surviving Indians ceased to resist and dispersed, fleeing.

The troops of Babur occupied the emptied camp of Rana Sangi, who was four miles from the place of battle, and captured many trophies. Some of the winners rushed to pursue the fugitives, finishing them off straight ahead, however, as the evening was approaching, they had to return to the camp.

For Babur, this battle, became the most important for the entire period of his campaigns to India. He managed to suppress the resistance of the strongest opponent, which prevented the final establishment of his power in India.

It is noteworthy that Babur's cannons, effective in field battles, were ineffective during the siege, in particular, they could not penetrate the stone walls of the Rajput fortress Chandari in January 1528. Obviously, their caliber was not large.

May 6, 1529 Babur won the third major victory, against the Bengalis at Gogra. Again, the decisive role played by guns and squeaks. After this, the conquest of northern India was completed.

The military organization of Babur was organized according to the principle of the army of Amir Timur, was based on the decimal system and was divided into wings, which were called barangar, javangar.

The basis of the army of Zahiraddin Muhammad Babur was made up of soldiers of heavy and medium cavalry, infantry with guns and artillery. Mounted militia zamindars and jagirdars made up the horse troops. This is very similar to the cavalry of the army of Amir Timur.

Babur had artillery, and he skillfully used this type of weapon. His guns and infantry were covered by wagenburgs - bound by chains of carts. This innovation Babur borrowed from Europe, where it was widely used in antiquity. They used this tactic, making their infantry extremely effective in the fight against the enemy cavalry.

According to various sources, it can be determined that the army of Babur had various heavy cast iron cannons and light guns that were only slightly larger than the musket and were transported on camels.

Subsequent Babur's descendants perfected using of artillery and entered into the troops horse artillery - small bronze cannons. They were transported in carts, each of which harnessed a pair of horses or bulls. Something similar in the European army appeared, much later.

Based on the study of strategy and tactics Z.M. Babur on the conduct of battles and military operations, organization of the army structure, command and control, and the interaction can draw the following conclusions:

First, the troops of Babur had firearms, primarily artillery, which was absolutely unknown to the army of Indian rulers and military commanders. Personal valor Rajputs could not compete with the first-class weapons of the enemy, even despite their numerical advantage;

Secondly, Babur's army was more disciplined and organized, each soldier knew his task thoroughly. In the army of Indian Rajputs, everyone fought at their own peril, and risk;

Thirdly, the strategy and tactics of Babur favorably differed from the straightforward Rajput method of conducting combat. Perhaps the loss of Indians would be much less, if not for the stubbornness with which the Rajput waves went on the offensive again and again. For example, Rana Sanga as the commander lost Babur his personal battle, he practically did not use the maneuver. His illustrious cavalry spent their forces in frontal attacks, not at altitude were also fighting elephants, frightened muskets and cannons;

Fourthly, Babur always prior to the battles assigned a special role to the moral and psychological mood of his soldiers, and he managed to inspire his army with spectacular pathetic gestures before the battle;

Fifth, Babur managed to take advantage of the hidden disagreements that existed with the enemy, which enabled him to win over to his side a number of units and communities that are in the military service of the enemy.

On the whole, it can be said that in all the battles in India the professionally regular Mughal army, demonstrated its absolute superiority over the professional but irregular army of medieval India.

Adabiyotlar

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